Live Blog of Texas Senate session of May 14, 2013

Catrisk will be attempting to live blog the Texas Senate session today that starts at 11 a.m. You can access the video here.  I can’t promise I’ll be able to do the entire session as various day job events may intervene. I have no idea if S.B. 1700 will come up today and, if so, what amendments might be proposed.  I can say that my “Minimalist Fix” post has gotten an awful lot of hits in the past few days.

15.00

So, nothing happened on windstorm insurance on the floor of the Texas Senate today.  The one thing perhaps everyone could agree on is that time is running out to change anything in this regular session of the 83rd Legislature.

12.40

They are recessing until 2:15.  The Senate Business and Commerce meeting will have a meeting at Chairman Carona’s desk during the recess.  I have no idea what they will discuss.

Unfortunately, my day job is likely to prevent me from keeping even half an eye on the Senate for the next several hours, so you are all on your own for a bit.

12.20

Might be oyster and shrimp lunch time because nothing has happened on the Senate floor for quite some time.  Oh, wait. They just started up again.  But they are just reading and referring House bills to Senate committees.

11.58

Senate back considering bills, but not (yet) S.B. 1700.  The current one, on toll road conversion, is generating some actual comment.

11.31

They are into announcements rather than bill consideration.  But the chair indicates there may be additional bills to be heard today.

11.20

Senator Royce West certainly gets his colleagues’ attention by saying he was adding billion to the cost of a bill on digitizing filings in civil lawsuits.  Just kidding.

10.51

Senator Larry Taylor, sponsor of SB 1700, is now speaking, but not on Windstorm Insurance. Instead, he is talking about CSSB 1560 involving easements.

10.49

Chair says, “Members, that concludes the morning call.” Looks as if they are now taking up substantive bills.

Screenshot_5_15_13_11_46_AM

10.40

Oyster and shrimp lunch for legislators being discussed.  No Windstorm bill yet.

11.42

Senate recesses until 11 a.m. Wednesday, May 15, 2013.  Still no S.B. 1700.

11.22

Reading and referring various bills to committees.  Does this mean voting on bills out of committee is over for today?

11.03

Actual debate on the floor. Not about windstorm insurance but about the right to marry.  And not about gay marriage but about photo identification. Should one need photo identification as a prerequisite to marriage?

10.44

Not that it has anything to do with windstorm insurance, but an interesting bill for insurance junkies on subrogation rights and the “make whole doctrine”.  H.B. 1869.  I’ll have to read it.

10.35

Now calling bills for review.  So the procedure seems to be

1) Suspend regular order of business so that the bill can be considered “out of order”; Vote on this.

2) Floor amendments offered and voted on.

3) Move passage to third reading.

4) Motion to suspend the 3 day delay between second and third reading

5) Third reading of bill (just caption)

6) Motion for final passage.  Roll call vote.

10.09

Session begins.

10.01

Upbeat music now playing heralding the possible start of session.  Also, please note that due to some issue with my liveblogging software, the time stamps are an hour off.  So, if this says 10:02 I believe it means 11:02.

09.58

Nothing happening.  Various people milling around.  No sound, but I am hoping that is because the microphones are off rather than any issues with my Internet feed.

13.35

Motion to adjourn until tomorrow. Passes.  So no S.B. 1700 today. #SB1700 #TWIA

13.34

Motions being heard to suspend Senate rules to permit announcements of urgent committee meetings.  No sign of S.B. 1700.

13.31

I get the sense that if you watched this Internet broadcast for a few days you might actually understand Senate procedure pretty well.

13.26

Wow, things move fast once they get to the Senate floor.  My sense is that everything is negotiated out ahead of time off the floor.  Still no sign of S.B. 1700.  We are hearing reading and referral of various bills.

16.09

The TWIA board today decided not to decide whether to consent to a receivership, tabling the idea until its May meeting.  That leaves the ball back in the court of Texas Insurance Commissioner Eleanor Kitzman, who can try to throw TWIA into receivership without TWIA’s consent.

A symbolic representation of the actions of TWIA's board today

A pictographic representation of the actions of TWIA’s board today

This is also the end of the live blog experiment.  It went well until my feed went out.  Next on the agenda, hearings in Austin on SB 1089 that would “fix” TWIA by placing more of the burden on people who don’t have real estate on the coast.

14.50

Alas, I must deal with reality and stop watching the blank screen.  If they’re still on when I return, I’ll live blog some more.  Otherwise, we’ll skip the play by play and go to some analysis at the end of the day.  Thanks for viewing.

14.24

While we’ve been waiting, I got a phone call from another attorney who had evidently been retained to examine the possibility of TWIA making an assessment under the old law.  Looks like that attorney, examining the issue independently, was likewise extremely dubious about making an assessment under 2210.058. #twia. Lots of hurt, but I still don’t see any cavalry coming over the hill.

14.21

No longer getting the error message and the little timer at the bottom says 2:25, so maybe my feed is back but they are still speaking to their attorneys.  Would not be surprised if this took a lot of discussion since they will basically be consenting to putting themselves out of business. #twia

14.07

Just got a tweet saying they are still in closed session.  So there is some hope that the video feed will emerge from what may be mere hibernation.  I am also advised that the audience has, quite literally, been left in the cold. #overairconditioning #twia

14.00

Still no connection to the TWIA video server.

13.45

I fear I have lost my feed of the meeting. Getting the mysterious Error 0-3222 message.

13.39

One of the matters brought up by Greg Smith of the Coastal Task Force was whether TWIA was being treated equivalently to the Texas FAIR plan, a sister government-sponsored insurance company. He contended, I believe, that the FAIR plan was likewise insolvent but was not being put into receivership.  This issue was also brought up by TWIA with TDI, but the TDI representative said she did not know if the FAIR plan was insolvent.

So, although I can’t find a 2012 financial statement on the Web for the FAIR plan (hmm?), I can find a 2011 financial. It apparently shows that the FAIR plan was million in the red. It may be, however, that TDI thought that the FAIR plan could work its way out of this negative position.  Whether that occurred, I don’t know either.

Oh. Seeing some action on the video screen for the meeting.

13.29

I just posted an excerpt of the letter from Rep. Deshotel. I now see, by the way, that the letter was signed by State Representatives Joe Deshotel (District 22), Craig Eiland (District 23), Abel Herrero (District 34), Todd Hunter (District 32), Eddie Lucio III (District 38) and Allan Ritter (District 21). This is the only thing even close to a legal argument I have found explaining how TWIA could recapitalize and avoid receivership by assessing insurers under the old statute. But, as the letter concedes, former Commissioner Geeslin did not actually say that TWIA could assess the insurance industry under the old law (although he does, I agree, come close to doing so).  But this is what good old Latin-liking lawyers call an “ipse dixit.”  That’s the fancy term for, “because I said so.”  It’s not a legal argument.  There is no evidence that former Commissioner Geeslin confronted section 44(2) of HB 4409 and had a theory for how the word “repeal” does not mean exactly what it says.  Section 2210.058 of the old law was the provision that permitted insurer assessments — and that statute was repealed four years ago in HB 4409.

Now, the more interesting question — one also raised by some of the public comment —  is whether the State Representatives are trying to set up some kind of lawsuit against someone for failure to assess adequately while the old law was in effect.  Such a lawsuit, however, is problematic in that, even if it prevails, which would likely be an uphill struggle, how is anyone going to pay a judgment?  Moreover, I suspect TWIA board members will find at least qualified immunity from suit, will be able to argue that they thought the assessment was adequate, and will question standing and duties.  Don’t count on such a lawsuit fixing TWIA ever — and certainly not in the short run. And short, in this context, means at least three hurricane seasons’ worth.

13.18

The Deshotel letter key paragraph

The Deshotel letter key paragraph

13.15

So, let’s go to the halftime report.

We need to separate out the harm caused by TWIA being insolvent from TWIA being put into receivership.  TWIA’s insolvency is a real problem in that it means, if the accountants are correct, that TWIA does not have enough money to pay claims and that it does not anticipate enough money to do so through the end of this year even if there is no significant storm. It is just fascinating that this singular fact does not appear to bother any of the speakers from the coast who came to the hearing today. Instead, the focus is on receivership.  Why? Do they think that grab law, which is the alternative to receivership, is an improvement?

The best arguments against receivership were that it might hurt the ability to obtain a Bond Anticipation Note secured by the potential for Class 1 securities being issued and that it might possibly hurt issuance of Class 2 and 3 securities. But the empirical evidence on this point is awfully thin.  It is not clear that a BAN could be issued anyway or that a post-petition receivership would hurt rather than help short term bond creditors.

The other thing that I think is clear is that the TDI Commissioner is going to act swiftly here.  She has a first mover advantage and does not need the TWIA board’s cooperation. TWIA’s board can cooperate, which might matters go more swiftly and less expensively, or it can make some short term political hay by opposition.  But what would it really accomplish except make some people who have demonized the incumbent insurance commissioner feel better in the short run?

The other matter I wonder about is seeing this as just one move in the Austin chess game about how TWIA is going to be restructured or depopulated.  Does the fact that it is in receivership help the argument to move towards an assigned risk plan as in HB 18? And maybe that is what this is all about.  If TWIA has “failed,” then the case for propping it up may look weaker and the case for going to something significantly different, a market oriented assigned risk plan may look stronger.

And, by the way, we are now on minute 10 of the 5 minute break.

13.04

TWIA goes into a closed session at 2:05. Apparently just a 5 minute break.  Except that in my experience one should add a zero to declared break times.   Anyway, we are done with Round 1.

13.03

TDI: Why is receivership in best interests in policyholders. TWIA does not have enough assets to pay its liabilities. Current claimants may not get claims paid fully. Make sure that actual damages being sustained are given priority. [Over what? Extra-contractuals?]

TDI: We are ready to move quickly in court. But stakeholders can have input through court process. File your plan and set a hearing.  At TDI, we try to be ready for all scenarios. [i.e. they are writing a plan]/

 

13.00

TWIA: Who is this rehabilitator? Why does TDI think that the rehabilitator can do a better job than this board.

TDI: Insurance Commissioner appointed as receiver but a competitive bid to find a manager. We can get someone on an interim emergency basis.  There are better statutory remedies in receivership. [Like not pay claims in full!]

12.58

TDI: Rehabilitation stays and centralizes lawsuits [just like federal bankruptcy].

TWIA: What can we assume with Class 1 bonds in designing reinsurance program. Looks encouraging that we can get a 0 million BAN to help reinsurance. But receivership would make that harder said the TPFA folks [I think I have this comment correctly] TPFA said it had offer from Bank of America, though at a higher price tag. [This is an important issue]

TDI: We would be moving in and out quickly. TDI  has concerns about ability to issue BAN anyway given negative surplus. [Darned straight].

12.55

TWIA: Effect on mortgages and covenants

TDI: Freddie and Fannie accept residual market insurance.  Ratings relate to private insurers.  [So is she saying all is well with mortgagees].

TWIA: What about residual markets in rehab.

TDI: Can’t predict what they would do. They have had conversations.

12.53

TWIA: Why now?

TDI: 4th quarter statement. Additional litigation that created a negative surplus. And no realistic opportunity to earn its way out. Rehabilitation would not inhibit vital reform measures on the table.

TWIA: Impact on reinsurance purchase? And post-event bonds?

TDI: Receivership can definitely create challenges. We will get a plan on file very quickly. Receivers can purchase reinsurance. The goal would be to get out of rehabilitation quickly. [Don’t bet on this occurring]. Work with bond market and see what we could do. [Vague]

 

12.51

TWIA: What happens to this board if TDI puts TWIA in receivership?

TDI: Board would be suspended and the rehabilitator would operate with the power of the Board. Board could be reconstituted after emergence.

TWIA: We’ve been in administrative oversight.  We have limited authority. Why the need for this board to consent?

TDI: Things move quicker when there is consent. If rehabilitation were consented to, there would be less disruption. On the same day, the AG can go to court, enter a rehabilitation application and enter a rehabilitation order almost simultaneously. We would soon have a rehabilitation plan. Fears would be quelled. If we have a contest, there will be more uncertainty and delay. At TDI, lack of disruption is important.

TWIA: A lot of the testimony we have heard today about nervousness of bankers etc. — at least there would be a plan to take care of it.

TDI: Yes.

12.48

TDI: Being back to zero balance would be enough to get it out of receivership.

TDI (Jamie Walker). Based on projections for TWIA income there will still be negative surplus at the end of this year.  And this is in case there are no “hiccups” [like a hailstorm?].

TWIA: Is the FAIR plan insolvent? It too has a negative surplus.

TDI: I don’t know.

12.46

TDI: Rates would be continued under the current statute, unless laws are specifically changed.  [TDI being very careful and lawyerly in its answers.  Lawyerly used as a positive adjective here].

TWIA: What would be the standard to get TWIA out of rehabilitation given that TWIA is not generally supposed to have surplus.

TDI: TWIA is not required to have an excess of surplus. TDI lawyer specifying basis for receivership. Insufficient assets, not an inability to pay bills.

12.43

TWIA: that paints a pretty rosy picture.  What other states did you look at?

TDI: More than 25 states have this law.  Modeled it after NAIC act.

TDI: Rehab has not been used in the residual market before.

TDI: Process depends on specific case. If something were to happen, we would move very expeditiously. Move to rehabilitation. Rehab order by the court. Rehabilitator would file a rehab plan within one year, but it could be done in a matter of days. How were claims going to be paid and what the process would be.

12.41

TDI has no specific comment, but available to answer questions.

TWIA Board now asking questions. Receivership has a stigma. Could TDI  talk through pros and cons of receivership?

TDI: Two types of receivership. Rehabilitation and liquidation. Rehab akin to a Chapter 11 in bankruptcy. Purpose is to revitalize an insurer so it can go into the marketplace. Company can pay claims, issue policies, without market disruption.

12.38

Public comment over. Moving on. Consideration of following topics: Review options for addressing financial condition of Association.  Including receivership. Notes representation from TDI.

12.37

Eddie Cabazos — Item on agenda to go into closed session. Is that not a violation of the open meeting act? [No.]

Answer — The Open Meetings law requires final action to be taken in open session. but advice of counsel can cause a closed session.

12.35

Tom Tagliabue, Government relations person for the City of Corpus Christi. Also opposed to receivership.

12.35

Joe Vega, Mayor of City of Port Isabel [again apologies for misspelling of names].  Will hurt small businesses.

Mr. William Goldsten, Corpus Christi — Negative economic impacts to engineering and construction profession along the Gulf Coast. [You know, these are probably all fine people, but that is not the issue.  The issue is whether receivership is the best way to address TWIA insolvency.  The fact that the legislature is in session is relevant, but not dispositive.  Grab law is the alternative to receivership.  Receivership is really a code word for insolvency.  In law school, we call this argumentative technique, “fighting the hypothetical] It will create chaos along the coast. #twia. Reduce the discrimination against the coast.

12.31

Eric Sandberg, Texas Banker’s Association — We need to have viable insurance in place, particularly from a regulatory standpoint.

12.30

Eric Sanburg, Texas Banker’s Association — skipped

David Garza, Cameron County.  [Ever get the sense this might be a bit one-sided presentation of commentary?  Looks like the coast, whose ox appears gored, has gotten its political act together whereas diffuse other constituencies have not]. Receivership is not the answer.  Let the legislature do its job. If we don’t get adequate results from this legislative session, do what it takes to make us solvent.  Our bankers and mortgage holders are nervous. [Let alone homeowners and businesses!]

12.27

Foster Edwards, the Corpus Christi Chamber of Commerce. CCCofC has been working with TWIA staff for years. A “bonehead idea, frankly.” Expressed well in letter on page E4 of packet, signed by four state representatives. [Is this the Deshotel letter that I just posted to this blog.]

12.24

Mr. Perkins with the Coastal Windstorm Taskforce: Mayor of Ingleside. We speak with one voice in opposition to go into receivership.  Again the argument that assessments are available.  [Has it occurred to anyone to actually read the statute?]  Development will be hurt. [Maybe industry could pay people extra to help purchase insurance?] Let the legislature do its job. Create a transition from TWIA to some other entity but not an instant effect on the market.

12.22

Charlie Zahn, Coastal Windstorm Taskforce: Close to matching up bills for final consideration by Senate. [Really?]  Legislative process needs to take care of this issue. Receivership implies TWIA does not have the ability to pay its bills in the future. You don’t have the basis for receivership. Trust fund in place.  You have the ability to assess. [HOW??] We are a viable entity. #twia. Already had a negative impact on Texas coast, including banks. [Probably true] Can they continue to provide mortgage loans. [Yes, a legitimate concern.  But is it receivership that is causing the problem or the insolvency.]

12.18

Greg Smith, Coastal Taskforce: Question of solvency should be judged as a residual carrier, not as a private insurer.  There are other residual carriers that are much worse off than TWIA.  National Flood, New Jersey FAIR Plan and Louisiana FAIR plan are worse off. Yet no question about their solvency. Will send messages to other carriers across the nation.  Rating agencies say you don’t have to have positive surplus.  [The everyone is doing it defense?]

12.16

Anne Vaughan, Port Aransas Chamber of Commerce [my apologies for any misspelled names]. Oppose what is “nothing more than an insane idea.” [Why is it insane to put an insolvent entity into receivership? Kubler-Ross stages of grief comes to mind. Denial. Anger] Has unconfirmed Commissioner of Insurance thought this through? TWIA is our only source of insurance. [But if it were not, one would never know if TWIA premiums were too low]

12.13

TWIA board member distinguishing between comments of TWIA and comments of TDI.

12.12

Joe McComb of Nueces County: Precinct 4.  The fun part of Nueces County. I do know people are concerned about coverage.  If they’ve got TWIA, they’ve shopped coverage and they have no alternative.  Worried that the decision has been made. [Yup]  Give legislature 60 days to solve this problem.  Good part of having a crisis is that the legislature is in session.  Place faith in elected officials. It will take 60-120 days to implement receivership anyway.  [Most persuasive speaker so far].

12.09

Keith McMullen with Port Aransas: Mayor of Port Aransas. Please don’t pursue receivership. Don’t case doubt on insurance market on the coast. Already created nervousness.

12.08

Schlitterbahn Waterpark representative speaks:  How will receivership impact existing contracts with lenders and vendors? TWIA receivership creates uncertainty that will chill business. [True, but what is the alternative if TWIA is insolvent? — SJC]. Before TWIA placed in receivership, other funding alternatives should be explored. [Like what? Assessments?]  My editorial comments are in brackets.

12.06

Jim Rich of Beaumont Chamber of Commerce: Very concerned about receivership. Notes importance of coast to economy. Wants a legislative solution. Let the legislative process work.  [But what if nothing happens? — SJC]

12.03

Public comment limited to 3 minutes with a timer. No more than 30 minutes to public comment period before moving to the rest of the agenda.

12.01

Calling roll

11.59

If you can see this it is a part of Rep. Deshotel’s letter.   It’s the first inkling of any legal theory behind the idea that TWIA can still asess for Ike.  Don’t expect insurers to buy it.geeslin assessment theory

11.55

Meeting is beginning.  One can see people milling on the video.

11.53

Channel 12 News (Beaumont) reports that State Representative Joe Deshotel has issued a press release opposing placement into receivership. Add him to the list of people whom I believe are mistaken on the law.  Here’s what he says in his letter:

If the Board would simply follow the law in place for these 2008 policies by assessing the insurance companies and moving the premium money to the Trust Fund, which currently has 8 million, TWIA would have over 5 million, which is hundreds of millions more (50%) than the Trust Fund has ever had!

11.50

Rick Spruill of the Corpus Christi Caller posted a preview of today’s meeting about 20 minutes ago.

11.46

In theory, you should also be able to follow this blog on Twitter using the hashtag #twia

11.40

Here some issues I expect to hear discussed at the meeting:

1) Is TWIA really as insolvent as its annual statement asserts (i.e. 3 million in the hole).  There are occasionally discretionary choices that get made in insurance accounting.  And there are occasionally mistakes.  Does anyone have a credible argument that TWIA is not seriously insolvent?

2) Assuming TWIA is insolvent, what, if anything, is the real alternative to a receivership?  When an entity is insolvent, as TWIA apparently is, that means some creditors can not be paid in full. If you fail to create an orderly process to pay claims, it means that the entity gets taken apart piecemeal and that different creditors are randomly (or systematically) treated worse than they should be. This is why we have insolvency law and (in most instances) bankruptcy law. Why should TWIA be treated differently?

3) Is there any authority as several coastal politicians have maintained to help TWIA out by assessing insurers for losses attributable to Hurricane Ike?  This blog has repeatedly maintained here, here and here that there is no such legal authority and that the old legal authority, section 2210.058 of the Insurance Code, was repealed in 2009.  Let’s see if there is anything more than denial or bluster behind the claim that TWIA can assess insurers without there being a new storm that would justify the issuance of public securities?

Texas Senate may take up S.B. 1700 today

Status

The Texas Senate via the internet

The Texas Senate via the internet

There are rumors that the Texas Senate may take up S.B. 1700 today. You can watch the Senate in action here. In the mean time, the Senate is also taking up another important issue, state retiree health insurance. If they get to S.B. 1700.  I will try to live blog, but no promises. You can also get Tweets from Rick Spruill of the Corpus Christi Caller at @Caller_Rick.

 

S.B. 1700 placed on “Intent Calendar”

Note: this post has been edited on May 10, 2013, to reflect very helpful information I have received this morning.

According to Texas Legislature Online, S.B. 1700, a bill that would significantly alter funding and other aspects of the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association, has or will be placed on the “Intent Calendar” tomorrow, May 10, 2013.  So far as I can figure out, this placement is the predicate for a vote on the bill in the Texas Senate. This masterpiece of special interest legislation may thus be nearing approval (or rejection) by that part of our bicameral legislature in the next few days. To become law, however, it will need approval by the Texas House and signature by Governor Rick Perry.

The best explanation I have received of what this means comes from former Texas House member Patricia Gray, with whom I have had the pleasure of working for many years.  She writes:

In the Senate, there have to be 21 votes to bring a bill to the floor.  If it is on the intent calendar, Larry Taylor is counting to see if he has the 21–if he does, he can ask [Lieutenant Governor David] Dewhurst to call it up for floor debate.  From there it only needs a simple majority (16) to pass the Senate.  Time is getting very short — if he can’t move it in the Senate, it may  it may not make it.  I think tomorrow [May 10] is the last day for House bills to pass in the House, so unless there is a House vehicle to attach it to when House bills get to the Senate, it will not pass if he doesn’t have 21 votes to get it to the Senate floor.

Here are more official explanations.

Intent calendar

Senate rules require that bills and resolutions be listed on the regular order of business and be considered on second reading in the order in which committee reports on the measures are submitted to the senate. During a regular session, the senate adopts a further rule specifying that before a bill or joint resolution may be brought up for floor debate out of its regular order, notice of intent must be filed with the secretary of the senate by 3 p.m. on the last preceding calendar day the senate was in session. A senator may give notice on no more than three bills or resolutions before April 15 and on no more than five bills or resolutions on or after April 15. Senate rules direct the secretary of the senate to prepare a list of all legislation for which notice has been given. The list, called the Intent Calendar, must be made available to each senator and to the press not later than 6:30 p.m. on the day the notice is filed. No bill or resolution may be considered on its first day on the Intent Calendar, and a vote of two-thirds of the senators present is required before any of the measures listed on the Intent Calendar may be debated. The senate rules do not require measures to be brought up for consideration in the order listed on the Intent Calendar, and the senate routinely considers only a portion of those measures listed on the Intent Calendar for a given day. A senator must give notice from day to day for a measure that was not brought up for consideration to remain on the Intent Calendar. Any provision of the senate rule governing the Intent Calendar may be suspended by a vote of four-fifths of the members present.

 

http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/gtli/legproc/process_senagenda.html

 

Here’s another explanation:

Senate Action

Lacking a calendars committee, the Senate relies on the Intent Calendar which schedules bills for general consideration in the order in which they are reported favorably out of committee. However, the Senate does not follow this order. At the beginning of the legislative session, a dummy bill (not intended for floor action) is placed at the top of the Intent Calendar, making it necessary to take up all other bills outside of the regular order.

To do this the sponsor of the bill or a member of the reporting committee must get recognition from the President of the Senate (the Lieutenant Governor) to make a motion to take up a bill outside of the Intent Calendar order. Two-thirds of the members who choose to vote must approve such an action.

If the bill is taken up by the Senate, it is given its second reading, at which point it is opened for debate and amendment. As in the U.S. Senate, there is a tradition in the Texas Senate that permits members to speak for as long as they wish (or otherwise can physically sustain). When members try to kill a bill by “talking it to death” and using up so much time that the rest of the Senate agrees to move on, this is known as a filibuster.

If the bill is approved on the second reading, it is ready for its third reading and, ultimately, final approval. As in the House, amendments are allowed at this point and require a two-thirds majority vote of members present.

Although the Texas Constitution requires that a bill receive each of its three readings on three separate days, this rule can be suspended by a four-fifths vote of members present. Though the House rarely uses this motion, it is routinely used in the Senate to pass non-controversial legislation, particularly toward the end of a legislative session.

 

http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu/2_8_3.html

TWIA Board tries to borrow $500 million and get $1.15 billion in reinsurance

The TWIA board met Friday.  I could not listen in on the meeting so my information is very limited.

Pre-Event Bonds

It appears that TWIA is going to seek $500 million in pre-event bonds for the 2013 hurricane season in order to augment its skimpy $180 million catastrophe reserve fund.  Although the total of $680 million is inadequate to address the $70 billion plus in total insured value, it is still an improvement over the $180 million that might be the only certain funding.  My AIR/RMS derived hurricane models  (CompoundPoissonDistribution[0.54, WeibullDistribution[0.42, 177000000]]) suggest this reduces the probability that TWIA will be unable to pay claims in full for hurricanes this year down from 14% to about 9%.  Yes, TWIA may be paying a high interest rate to engage in this sort of borrowing, and from what I understand the borrowing has yet to be consummated, but this is a significant step.

Reinsurance efforts

I also understand from a Rick Spruill Twitter post that TWIA is going to seek $1.15 billion in reinsurance.  What I can’t tell you right now is

  • at what level will the reinsurance attach, i.e. atop the Class 3 as I have recommended or inserted between Class 2 and Class 3 as a Guy Carpenter presentation suggested might occur
  • will the reinsurance “drop down” in the event any of the post-event bonds underlying it can not be sold; if not this reinsurance may well be worthless
  • what premium will TWIA pay for this reinsurance; TWIA in the past has paid very high rates for reinsurance that probably had higher attachment points
  • will the market in fact sell TWIA this much reinsurance; reinsurance capacity is not unlimited
  • is the reinsurance per occurrence or per year; it matters a lot if we have multiple storms
  • if per occurrence, what right of reinstatement will TWIA have and at what price

These are all very important questions in assessing the extent to which TWIA policyholders are at risk for this summer while the Texas legislature considers alternative short and long run fixes.

One additional note

Although the decrease from 14% risk of failure to a 9% risk of failure is significant, one must recognize that over a long period of time, 9% risks materialize.  There is, for example, an 85% chance that a 9% risk will materialize at some point during a 20 year period.  So, getting funds up to $680 million is a positive development, it is not by any means a long run solution.

TWIA Board to Consider 2013 Reinsurance, Bonds

With just 30 days to go before the start of hurricane season, the Board of the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (TWIA) will meet tomorrow, Friday, May 3, 2013, in Austin to discuss issues critical to its survival.  Among the items on the agenda are purchases of reinsurance and attempts to sell both pre-event and post-event bonds.  Both of these items are likely to prove extremely difficult for TWIA to manage.  Not on the public agenda is any further consideration of having TWIA placed into receivership.

Reinsurance

Let’s look at the reinsurance issue first. TWIA will be receiving a presentation from its long time insurance broker, Guy Carpenter. You can get a copy of that presentation here. It’s a fascinating document. It rests on an awfully cheerful view of TWIA’s ability to sell post-event bonds.  That’s not a view shared by the Texas Insurance Commissioner or, for what it is worth, by me. It shows TWIA is considering a reinsurance purchase option that would help insurers but would hurt policyholders. And it exposes yet again the extent to which the never-ending need to purchase reinsurance created by the undercapitalization of TWIA, forces TWIA to pay extremely high rates for that protection. If one wanted Exhibit A for why TWIA should be substantially depopulated rather than propped up so it can expand, the material for this board meeting would not be a bad place to start.

WHY IS GUY CARPENTER ASSUMING REINSURANCE CAN ATTACH AT $2.3 BILLION?

The Guy Carpenter presentation proceeds on the dubious assumption that TWIA can sell post-event bonds and thus can attach as high as $2.3 billion in the funding stack.   Look at the following picture found on Slide 8. (You may need to click on it, which will cause it to zoom in).

Proposed reinsurance arrangement for 2013

Proposed reinsurance arrangement for 2013

 

Notice that it presupposes that TWIA will be able to sell $2 billion worth of Class 1, Class 2  bonds and thus explores attachment at the top of the Class 2 stack.  But this is a very strange assumption to make.  First, as the Texas Public Finance Authority and the Texas Insurance Commissioner have stated, and as seems clearly correct, TWIA will not be able to sell the full $1 billion of Class 1 bonds.  And has been discussed on this blog before, the Class 2 bonds can’t sell if the Class 1 bonds don’t sell out and the Class 2 Alternative bonds have difficulties as well. So, the whole discussion of reinsurance attaching no lower than about $2.3 billion rests on what sure looks like unwarranted optimism.

Now, to be sure, TWIA’s got a document in its packet for the meeting Friday that suggests it still thinks it can sell $500 in pre-event securities, $1 billion in Class 2 public securities and $500 million in Class 3 securities.  This document appears, however, to ignore section 2210.6136 of the Texas Insurance Code, which says that Class 2 Bonds can’t be issued unless the full $1 billion of Class 1 bonds sell out.  If the Class 1 bonds don’t fully sell, then one has to resort to the Class 2 Alternative bonds.  But as I’ve pointed out before, the Class 2 Alternative bonds may be almost as dubious as the Class 1 bonds. And the Class 3 bonds legally depend on all the Class 2 or Class 2 Alternative bonds selling out.  So, again it looks to me as if TWIA is still looking at this summer with very rosy glasses or has some interpretation of the Texas Insurance Code I don’t understand.

Note 1: There is an alternative presentation on slide 13 in which Guy Carpenter explores the possibility of the reinsurance attaching at $1.7 billion, but even this is an awfully optimistic perspective on TWIA’s ability to sell post-event bonds.

Note 2: In fairness to Guy Carpenter, there is a footnote attached to the graph stating “Actual amounts of bond tranches are subject to marketability.” Yes. But unless there’s been some miraculous turn around in TWIA’s bonding ability, this seems like the main point, rather than a footnote.

Why is Guy Carpenter not having the reinsurance attach at the top of the Class 3 bonds?

If you’ve ready my blog entry on The Curious Matter of Reinsurance Attachment, you’ll know that the TWIA board has to make a crucial tradeoff in determining where any reinsurance should attach.  Inserting the reinsurance between the Class 2 and Class 3 bonds protects insurers from assessments but buys, dollar for dollar, less protection for TWIA policyholders. Inserting the reinsurance on top of the Class 3 bonds gives policyholders more protection but increases the likelihood that insurers will have to pay.

Most of the bills pending in the legislature would prohibit TWIA from doing exactly what the Guy Carpenter presentation appears to suggest: protecting insurers from having to pay back Class 3 bonds rather than maximizing policyholder protection. Given the incredibly precarious situation facing TWIA policyholders this summer — sorry insurers — but the reinsurance should attach at the highest level possible, buying the most protection for policyholders with a provision for drop down in the event the post-event bonds can’t be sold.

The pricing of reinsurance continues to be incredibly high

The Guy Carpenter proposal suggests that TWIA is again going to have to pay through the nose for reinsurance partly as a result of it never having an adequate internal catastrophe reserve trust fund.  As I’ve spoken about on many occasions, this reinsurance trap — almost like borrowing from payday lenders to address financial vulnerability — basically insures that TWIA never escapes its poverty.

How can I say this?  Look at the models AIR and RMS provide both Guy Carpenter and TWIA.  Here’s slide 6 of the presentation.

AIR and RMS risk estimates

AIR and RMS risk estimates

If one assumes that the distribution of annual losses is a Compound Poisson distribution, with the Poisson parameter being 0.54 (as found in this scholarly article) and one assumes that the underlying distribution is a Weibull with parameters 0.42 and 177,000,000, you can generate data that matches up extremely well with that found by AIR and RMS.  If you then run, say, 10,000 years of simulations using that distribution, you find that the mean losses to an insurer who writes a maximum of  $850 million worth of coverage over a $2.3 billion retention is only about $20 million.  That is 4-5 times less than what the reinsurers are apparently proposing to charge.  And, thus, the cost of having to reinsure rather than internally finance is something like $65-$75 million per year, or about 1/6 of all TWIA’s premiums. You dont, by the way, get qualitatively different results using the three parameter Weibull distribution that I’ve used on this blog before to replicate the AIR/RMS models.

There’s a lot more that is odd about the reinsurance pricing. If we think of the price as being composed partly of expected losses and partly of having to withdraw the maximum exposure from illiquid high-earning investments and place it in low return, highly liquid investments — this is the Wharton School model — the pricing only makes sense if reinsurers lose about 7.8% on their capital by having to make it particularly liquid. ((-expectedLosses + premiums)/maxExposure). Given the market right now, that’s a pretty high number.

There are a couple of explanations between the actual pricing for reinsurance and the pricing that the models would suggest.  One, which is rather scary, is that the reinsurance market is not behaving as competitively as one would like.  The other, scary for different reasons, is that the reinsurance market doesn’t trust the AIR/RMS model and thinks the risk of a major hurricane is considerably greater.  If that’s true, however, then even the dire warnings that I  and others have been sounding about TWIA are understated.

Bonds

The Bond Anticipation Note

The other main item on the agenda appears to be the issuance of bonds.  There is a a proposal from First Southwest that TWIA sell by June 27, 2013, a “Bond Anticipation Note” for $500 million that would basically be an advance on a hoped-for similar Class 1 post-event bond. First Southwest apparently believes these unrated bonds could be sold at between 4 and 6%. My own 2 cents is that if TWIA can get this loan, it should grab it.  Increasing the amount it has to pay claims from its CRTF funds of $180 million to something like $680 million will help.  And if all it has to pay is some interest, that’s a good deal. But there’s a lot to do before this money will be available to TWIA and it looks as if it is going to have go through at least the first month of the 2013 hurricane season without it.

Post-Event Bonds

There’s also apparently a resolution on the table authorizing TWIA to asks the Texas Public Finance Authority to issue post-event bonds. I’ll confess I don’t understand this one.  There haven’t been any tropical cyclones yet in Texas for 2013.  Maybe TWIA is getting this resolution done to see what can actually done for 2013?  Maybe it is an attempt to see if things are as bad as some people have been saying?

Conclusion

The TWIA board is in a very tough spot.  With fewer than 30 days to go in the legislative session and 30 days until the start of hurricane season, it doesn’t really know what its resources are to pay claims. It’s being (understandably) threatened with receivership by the Texas Insurance Commissioner. And its existing reinsurance expires on May 31, 2013, before the start of hurricane season.  If and until TWIA gets some legislative relief or is put partly out of its misery by a Texas shift to an assigned risk plan or other mechanism that deconcentrates risk, it doesn’t have many good options. My hope is that the board will have the courage to confront its moral and legal obligation to warn policyholders in the clearest possible terms of the risks that, unless powerful legislative relief swiftly occurs, their claims will not be paid fully should a significant hurricane hit this summer.

The “Committee Substitute” to H.B. 3622 is a very different animal

I have now received a copy of the “Committee Substitute” to H.B. 3622 (CSHB 3622 Bill Text). This committee substitute house bill is a very different animal than the original H.B. 3622.

Changes to the Funding Structure in the Committee Substitute House Bill

Here are the changes to the funding structure that I note.

1. Under original H.B. 3622 (and the status quo), Class 2 post-events would be repaid 70% by coastal insureds via premium surcharges and 30% by insurers by assessment. The maximum amount of Class 2 bonds was $1 billion.  Now, the insurers are simply supposed to pay 30% of the bill up front via assessment and coastal insureds are supposed to repay up to $700 million in borrowings through premium surcharges.

2. TWIA is required, apparently no matter what the price and no matter what its financial condition, to purchase a base level minimum of $1 billion in reinsurance at the top of its stack.  I would be pleasantly surprised if such reinsurance could be purchased for less than $100 million. This is so because of the low attachment point  for the reinsurance that will now exist in light of the depleted Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund, the fact that the mandate puts TWIA over a barrel, and the historic pricing evidence. Standing alone, this reinsurance requirement should, however, bring the height of the stack for 2013 to about $2.98 billion ($180 million in CRTF, $800 million in assessment on insurers ($300 million interest free loan repaid by Texas through premium tax credits and $500 million true payment), $300 million in Class 2 assessments on insurers, $700 million in Class 2 post-event bonds paid for by coastal policyholders, and $1 billion in reinsurance)

3. If the catastrophe reserve fund has less than $1 billion in it, TWIA is required to purchase additional reinsurance so that the total height of its stack is the probable maximum loss for a 1 in 75 year storm.  By my calculations this will be a stack of roughly $3.7 billion. This provision thus requires TWIA to buy an additional $700 million in reinsurance. I would expect this extra level of reinsurance to cost between 50 and 70% of the cost of the first layer. Why so much?  Much of the premium for reinsurance is to pay the reinsurer for having to actually have ready access to its maximum exposure.  Moreover, the purchase of the first $1 billion will have shrunk limited global reinsurance capacity,

4. If the catastrophe reserve fund has more than $1 billion it, TWIA is required to purchase additional reinsurance so that the total height of its stack is the probable maximum loss for a 1 in 100 year storm.  By my calculations, this will be a stack of roughly $4.4 billion. If the CRTF has $1 billion, then the height of the stack with baseline reinsurance will be about $3.8 billion (see note below). TWIA will thus be required to purchase $600 million in additional reinsurance. I would expect this extra level of reinsurance to cost between 40 and 60% of the cost of the first layer.  Why?  Again, much of the premium for reinsurance is to pay the reinsurer for having to actually have ready access to its maximum exposure. And, again, there is not an unlimited supply of catastrophe reinsurance money.    The purchase of the first $1 billion will have shrunk limited global reinsurance capacity

5. The cost of the baseline reinsurance is borne by TWIA policyholders.  The cost of additional reinsurance, however, is borne by insurers in Texas, who will presumably figure out a way to pass the cost on. This, I now understand, is what insurance lobbyist Floyd Beamon was complaining about at the hearing yesterday.

Visualizations of the Funding Stack in the Committee Substitute House Bill

Here are some pictures of what the TWIA stack would look like under the Committee Substitute to H.B. 3622. Clearly there is a lot of “Piggy Pink” in these pictures — the color code for Texas insurers — and not very much “Teal Blue” — the color code for TWIA insureds. You’ll also notice some ‘Burnt Orange,” which, apologies to other Texas schools in advance, is the color code for the Texas fisc.  I hope to be able to post a more detailed analysis later today. My interim suspicion is that the Committee Substitute significantly decreases the risk of insolvency below that of the original bill (look at the last graph in this post). It does so, however, by forcing insurers to endure a far greater amount of what is euphemistically called “lift.”  In plain English, TWIA is yet again propped up for yet further expansion by using other people’s money. But at least it is made somewhat solvent for the near future and the reliance on the worst of the post-event bonds is eliminated.

 

TWIA Stack Under HBCS 3622 for various CRTF values

TWIA Stack Under HBCS 3622 for various CRTF values

 

 

H.B. 3622: the hearing yesterday. And is it getting worse?

Here’s a link to the House Insurance Committee hearing of April 30, 2013. My extensive fan network can skip to minute 10 and watch until minute 26 as I take on the Bonnen Brothers and discuss H.B. 3622 with the rest of the committee. Actually, it’s worth watching the whole thing, particularly the dance around the issue of whether H.B. 3622 mandates “actuarially sound rates.”  Answer: it does not.

Dennis Bonnen

Dennis Bonnen

Greg Bonnen

Greg Bonnen

 

 

 

 

 

 

A few quick observations:

  • Unconfirmed, but there is apparently a major change in H.B. 3622 that makes the bill worse than I thought.  In fact, if what I am hearing is true, I might now answer the question posed to me by Representative Greg Bonnen yesterday somewhat differently about which was better, his bill, which I did not like, or the status quo, which I also do not like.  If it is true, as I heard after the meeting, and as Beamon Floyd, a lobbyist for major Texas insurers suggested during his testimony, that a modified version of the bill relieves TWIA policyholders from the obligation of actually paying for the reinsurance that protects them but foists that $100 millionish burden onto insurers statewide, that makes H.B. 3622 even more problematic. If that’s true — and I hope to find out later today — my better answer might then be: “I can’t say: they are both awful in different ways. The status quo is awful because it does not create a high enough stack to protect TWIA policyholders from insolvency. HB 3622 is awful because it makes non-coastal residents pay even more of the burden of insuring on the coast and thereby sends even worse signals about development patterns and hurts the poor off the coast even more.”
  • It is apparently very common practice in the Texas legislature for there to be proposed changes to a bill — a “Committee Substitute” that are not posted to the otherwise wonderful Texas legislative website.  As a result, “outsiders” such as me find themselves testifying about provisions that have either been replaced or supplemented.  Apparently, one can usually get the committee substitute by asking the bill proponent, but it might enhance democracy — and make testimony more relevant — if these substitutes were available electronically or in some regularized procedure.
  • I think I now understand Representative Craig Eiland’s ideas on trying to assess insurers for Hurricane Ike.  He doesn’t want to assess under the old law.  What he seems to suggest is a new law that would assess insurers for anything up to $600 million “for Ike” and to justify that assessment on grounds that the insurers “escaped” that responsibility under the old law when TWIA messed up and failed to assess adequately.  It’s an interesting idea and I too am troubled by the failure to assess under the old law. It is partly responsible for the current deficiency in the Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund. But it is not an idea without legal risks. Although the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution applies only to retroactive imposition of criminal liabilityHarisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952), that rule has some qualifications (Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 381, 384 (1878)). Moreover, although what Representative Eiland is proposing isn’t quite a classical taking, it is a little disturbing.  The idea of taking money, even if for the public good, not as a condition of continuing to have an insurance business in Texas but as punishment for having previously done business in Texas and legally escaping what some wanted you to pay, may come close to constitutional prohibitions.  Make that assessment heavy enough and its relation to prior conduct or past legislative advocacy for the repeal of the old assessment law clear enough, and it might inspire the insurance industry to go out and find a good lawyer.
  • The Bonnen Brothers are both clearly intelligent people.  The absence of bombast in their tone is refreshing.

There will be more later today or tomorrow on the whole TWIA situation. Stay tuned as we head into the homestretch.

A closer look at H.B. 3622

Analysis

I have undertaken an analysis of H.B. 3622 that is going to be discussed in the House Insurance Committee at a hearing at 2 p.m. this Tuesday, April 30, 2013.  The one sentence summary is that, although it has some good features, H.B. 3622 is an economic disaster for the Texas coast and the rest of Texas because it does not create a high enough stack to protect against tropical cyclones. The probability of TWIA going bankrupt, even if it does not grow, over the next 20 years under this bill is about 22%. Here are the bullet points.

Baseline scenario

I conducted 1000 simulations of H.B. 3622 over its plausible shelf life of 20 years using models based on data provided to TWIA by AIR and RMS. TWIA policyholders end up paying via operating funds, reinsurance premiums and contributions to the catastrophe reserve fund for about 66% of the amount of TWIA losses.  There is thus about 34% subsidization in H.B. 3622.  The remaining losses are paid for approximately as follows: 9% by coastal insureds for paying off 70% of the Class 2 bonds, 12% by insurers (and, derivatively, their insureds) by low attachment Class1 Funding assessments, paying off 30% of Class 2 bonds, and high attachment Class 3 Funding assessments, 3% by the State of Texas via premium tax credits given to insurers that partly offset assessments, and, a disturbing 11% absorbed without insurance by TWIA policyholders when TWIA lacks funds with which to pay claims due to an inadequate stack. The pie chart below illustrates this distribution. For some caveats on this computation, see the note below.

Baseline distribution of payments under H.B. 3622

In 222 of those 1000 simulations, (22.2% of the time) TWIA became insolvent at some point during those 20 years. At first, I thought this had to be a mistake in my simulation. But, I did a back of the envelope computation that suggests it is an accurate result.  This high risk exists because, particularly over the next 5 years or so, the stack protecting TWIA policyholders is very low relative to potential losses.  Some depopulation of TWIA via, for example, lowering maximum policy limits or reducing moral hazard through higher deductibles and coinsurance would reduce this probability. My “envelope” containing the computation is set forth in the notes below.

Low reinsurance scenario

Reductions in the purchase of reinsurance produce yet worse results.  The 20-year risk of insolvency is now 29%. And TWIA policyholders pay for even less of the risk they create.  The pie chart below shows the distribution.

HB3622PieChartLowReinsurance

Higher Premium Scenario

Additional premiums paid in by TWIA policyholders could lower the risk of insolvency and increase their responsibility for losses. By increasing premiums 25%, the probability of insolvency is reduced to 21%, still far too high a number. The pie chart below shows, however, that TWIA policyholders now pay a larger proportion of losses suffered.

HB3622PieChartPremiumHike

Higher Maximum CRTF Payment Scenario

The rate of subsidization and the risk of insolvency would decrease significantly, if H.B. 3622 liberated the CRTF to do its job.  H.B. 3622 would be improved if the $1 billion ceiling in its section 6 (amending section 2210.072) placed on CRTF payments were replaced with $3 billion, as the maximum amount of CRTF funds that could be used to pay for losses. A conforming amendment should also be made to proposed section 2210. 4522. Such an amendment, although it would do little for the next 5 to 8 years, at least reduces the risk of insolvency in years down the road provided no major hurricane has previously hit the Texas coast.  Insolvency risk over the 20 year period would decline to 18% — still way too high but smaller.  And the distribution pie chart shows that now 73% of the losses are born through insurance by TWIA policyholders, though 9% is still unfunded.

HB3622PieChartBaselineWith3MCRTF

The failure to index the parameters to H.B. 3622, such as the maximum amount of the catastrophe reserve fund that can be used to pay a claim or the maximum assessments against insurers means that the insolvency risk grows if, as coastal interests desire, the value of property on coast continues to grow.

Conclusion

This bill, if were to be passed by a 2/3 majority, at least makes a dent in urgent crisis facing Texas for the 2013 hurricane season. It gets rid of the “bug” in current law that I have discussed in this blog recently. And it does away with the worst of post-event bonding as a funding mechanism. The bill, however, still suffers from several fundamental problems that threaten to destroy the Texas coast.  Unlike S.B. 18 that woud somewhat deconcentrate TWIA risk, it continues the concentration of correlated risk in a single entity. This placing of a lot of eggs in the single TWIA basket inevitably leads to extraordinarily high prices for reinsurance, which in turn prevents TWIA from building up adequate internal reserves in timely fashion. By insulating coastal Texas from market forces, the bill distorts development patterns and discourages risk mitigation. It perpetuates the economically unjustifiable large-scale subsidization from the poor in non-coastal Texas to the middle class and wealthy in coastal Texas. It continues to do so in an opaque manner by complexities such as insurer assessments and premium tax credits.  And it leaves the Texas coast and, derivatively, the rest of Texas extremely vulnerable over the reasonable lifespan of this bill to a devastating insolvency — a threat which itself is likely to retard coastal development.

Assumptions and Qualifications

I assume the AIR and RMS models are reasonable.  There is some evidence to suggest that the reinsurance industry believes these models are optimistic about the risk of severe tropical cyclones in Texas.  If that is true, the insolvency problem highlighted here becomes yet more serious.

My original analysis contained some errors; I attempt to fix them here. Most relate to my prior lack of complete recognition that the bill does away with Class 1 post-event bonds, the alternative Class 2 post-event bonds, and with Class 3 post-event bonds and substitutes assessment mechanisms for them.

I assume that insurers pay for about 20% of that portion of assessments for which a premium tax credit is available.  This percentage is a crude estimate of the time value of money.

I assume that insurers incur no costs in having to stockpile money to pay assessments.  This is an assumption made for purposes of simplicity and is obviously false.  Taking risk costs into account would mean that insurers bear even more of the costs of a system such as H.B. 3622.

I use a model of reinsurance pricing consistent with that in the literature under which reinsurance prices are based on the sum of the expected claims costs and a fraction of the maximum exposure. I have attempted to calibrate the model, particularly with respect to the fraction used to multiply maximum exposure, by looking at the amount TWIA has paid for reinsurance in recent years.  I continue my concern that TWIA is paying too much for reinsurance and substitute mechanisms for catastrophic risk transfer ought to be explored.

A copy of the Mathematica notebook underlying the assertions in this blog post is available here. I have not had the time to annotate it fully, but am happy to explain it and run different simulations should any legislator desire.

Three back of the envelope computations confirming a high probability that H.B. 3622 will leave TWIA insolvent over the next 20 years.

Method 1

If you have a stack like this one for 2013 that is likely to be at best only $2.98 billion high ($180 million CRTF, $800 million Class 1 Funding and $1 billion Class 2 Bonds plus an optimistic $1 billion in low attaching reinsurance) and you have roughly a 1.9% probability of a tropical cyclone losses that exceeds that sum, over 20 years, the cumulative probability of having at least one loss in excess of the stack is 31%.  (The survival function at 0 of a negative binomial distribution with 20 trials and a negative probability of 98.1% per trial).  It’s only because the stack can grow by perhaps $100 million per year on average (due to increases in the CRTF) and the fact that there the probability in the simulation drops to a still frightening 21.3%.

Method 2

I also performed a second simplified analysis in which one computed the height of the stack as a function of time under the optimistic assumption that TWIA suffered no major losses.  The height of the stack was set to increase as contributions to the CRTF increased.  I then computed the numeric probabilities for solvency each year.  I then multiplied these probabilities together.  By subtracting these values from 1, one obtains the probability at the end of each 20 year period that TWIA has become insolvent. I again see results between 15-25% depending on what assumptions are made.  These results are consistent with the findings made using the more elaborate methodology.

Method 3

I generated 10,000 storms from the AIR/RMS derived distribution.  I then partitioned these storms into groups of 20 and found the largest storm.  I then plotted the “Exceedance Curve” or “Survival Function” of this empirical order distribution.  I show the results below.  As one can see the probability of the largest storm being more than $3 billion is about 20%.  Even at $5 billion, the probability is above 15%.

Exceedance Curve for Largest Storm in 20 years

Exceedance Curve for Largest Storm in 20 years

Drop down Class 3 bonds: a bandaid for TWIA

A lot of ink has been spilled on this blog about fixing TWIA in the long run.  Having attended the hearing this past week in Austin and looking at my calendar, which shows 41 days until hurricane season, I am becoming less hopeful that a good long-run fix is in the works.  Moreover, two of the leading bills (S.B. 18 and H.B. 2352) do nothing to address the desperate situation for 2013.  I thus offer up the following as a minimalist bandaid for TWIA.  It will not by any means solve TWIA’s problems.  If, however, a solid solution can not be found, what I offer here may at least provide some assistance and, in my naive view, should be politically feasible. The Executive Summary is that the legislature needs to repeal the provisions prohibiting the Class 3 bonds from dropping down and instead permit them to drop down in the event the Class 2 Alternative bonds fail to sell, offering insurers a premium tax credit to the extent the drop down Class 3 bonds increase their subsidization of tropical cyclone losses along the Texas Gulf Coast.

History

I start with some history to explain the current problem.

In 2011, the legislature recognized that the system of post-event bonds it had established in 2009 as the means of recapitalizing TWIA following a significant storm was extremely vulnerable to a cascade of failures. Lenders could refuse to purchase the Class 1 bonds on whose sale higher levels of bonds legally depended and thus leave TWIA with only the money it had in its Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund to pay the claims of its policyholders. And lenders might very well refuse because repayment of the Class 1 bonds depended on TWIA policyholders remaining with TWIA even after it raised its premiums (perhaps 25%) to pay off the bonds. So, the legislature developed this complex scheme now codified in section 2210.6136 of the Insurance Code.

Unfortunately, the fix, which appears to have been developed deep into the legislative session, suffers a risk of the same infirmity as the legislative provisions it attempted to supplement. Class 1 bonds remained theoretically available but a contingency plan was developed: the Class 2 Alternative Bond (my name). This Class 2 Alternative Bond could be sold in the event that the entire $1 billion authorized in Class 1 bonds failed to sell in whole or in part. But, as with the Class 1 bonds, the Class 2 Alternative Bonds contained in the fix depend for their repayment in significant part in extracting large sums of money from a TWIA pool of insureds (a) after a significant hurricane has struck and (b) who can and may leave the pool if insurance premiums get too high. And while coastal residents and insurers share partial responsibility for the repayment and thus reduce the size of the TWIA premium increase, it is unclear if that contribution will be enough to persuade lenders that TWIA policyholders will remain in the pool and pay enough to amortize the bonds. Moreover, the legislation provided that Class 3 bonds, which provide an additional $500 million of borrowing capacity to pay for windstorm damages, can not be sold — repeat, can not be sold — unless every dime of borrowing capacity under the Class 2 Alternative Bonds is exhausted.

The current situation

The result of all this is a potential catastrophe. If, as many observers, including the Texas Insurance Commissioner expect, the Class 1 bonds fail in whole or in part because the market won’t accept them, the Class 2 Alternative Bonds may fail too. Why? Because their repayment source is infected — not as badly, but still infected — with the same problem as the Class 1 bonds. And if the Class 2 bonds fail even a little bit, the Class 3 bonds fail. And if the Class 3 bonds fail, there may well not even be any reinsurance protection. This is so because, if TWIA is not careful and does not purchase reinsurance — at a higher price — that drops down in the event the Class 2 and/or 3 bonds don’t sell, the reinsurer isn’t obligated to pay a dime. The $100 million of policyholder money dumped into reinsurance will have been 100% wasted. (I sure hope TWIA’s lawyers and reinsurance brokers understand this last point.). And so, TWIA will have only the $180 million or so in its Ike-depleted, failure-to-properly-assess-depleted Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund to pay claims. As my friend David Crump has pointed out, it may not even take a named tropical storm to generate damages of that magnitude to the $72 billion TWIA pool.

We thus end up with a short run problem in addition to a long run problem with TWIA. The long run problem is that the system of post-event bonds on top of a thin Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund is extremely unstable and potentially depends on massive subsidization by people other than policyholders to prop it all up. That is a hard problem to fix. Perhaps, as been suggested here, an assigned risk plan would be a better alternative. Perhaps, as others believe, the funding structure can be made more stable with yet greater subsidization. Those are hard and politically contentious issues. I am not certain they will be ironed out this legislative session before hurricane season begins in 41 days. And, sorry to say to, but it is a bit irksome to have to bail TWIA out yet again when doing so also rescues from humiliation the legislators who have shortsightedly engineered a system that beautifully served the short run interests of their constituents by underfunding their insurer but that has predictably betrayed those same constituents long run interests. Still, one can not help feeling a bit sorry for those on the coast who may have been fooled, perhaps eagerly so, by these false heroes.

The bandaid

What to do? Triple the minimum amount available for this summer. How?

1. Permit the Class 3 bonds to drop down. Repeal section 2210.6136(c), which currently prohibits the issuance of Class 3 bonds until all the Class 2 or Class 2 Alternative Bonds are sold. Instead, permit the Texas Insurance Commissioner to authorize sale of Class 3 bonds notwithstanding the failure of all Class 2 or Class 2 Alternative Bonds to sell if, in the opinion of the Commissioner, the failure to do so would reduce the amount available to pay claims of TWIA policyholders.

2. To the extent that Class 3 bonds drop down, make the assessments that are required to repay them simply a no-interest loan from insurers to the state rather than an outright payment. This can and has been done by making providing a premium tax credit for the assessments.  I dislike this philosophically because it is less transparent than simply taxing Texans and potentially reduces the amount available for government programs, but it is one way to raise money. To do this will require repeal of section 2210.6135(c) of the Insurance Code and perhaps some other statutory tinkering. The idea, however, is that to the extent an extra obligation has been imposed on the insurers of the state, it is one they should bear only as a vehicle for fronting money rather than in any ultimate sense. I believe sensible insurers should be willing to go along with this alteration. Moreover, as the state bears actual responsibility for up to $500 million, the costs of having the rest of the state subsidize TWIA will be more apparent to the electorate. It will thus be a great — albeit costly — learning opportunity.

Will this solve the TWIA problem for 2013. Absolutely not. This is a bandaid on a gaping wound. $680 million ($180 million in CRTF plus $500 million in dropped down Class 3) is not nearly enough to protect TWIA policyholders from even a minor tropical cyclone. Even $1.68 billion ($180 million in CRTF plus $500 million in Class 2 Alternative plus $500 million in dropped down Class 3 plus maybe $500 million in incredibly costly reinsurance) is not enough. At its current $72 biliion girth, TWIA at a minimum needs a $5 billion stack. But if you don’t have the time, will or ability to do major surgery, a bandaid is better than watching the patient bleed dry in front of you.  So, if the long run problem can not be solved before the start of hurricane season, or if the long run fix starts only in 2014, this extra money this bandaid creates for 2013 should be sorely appreciated when the wind and water starts roiling in the Gulf.

A simulation of H.B. 2352 and S.B. 1089

H.B. 2352, a bill to reform the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (TWIA) from Corpus Christi Representative Todd Hunter, is scheduled for hearing in the Insurance Committee of the Texas House this Tuesday afternoon at 2 p.m. I do not know yet if my teaching obligations will permit me to travel to Austin and testify, but if they do, here is about what I will say. It’s based on a Mathematica simulation of 100 sets of 100 years of storms and draws on work I’ve discussed here, herehere and here.

My name is Seth Chandler. I am a law professor at the University of Houston Law Center and author of the blog catrisk.net, which addresses the law and finance of catastrophic risk with a focus on Texas. The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the University of Houston.

I have attempted to simulate the effects of H.B. 2352 and its companion bill S.B. 1089. The details of that simulation, including the source code, are available in the written submission made to the committee and available at catrisk.net. Basically, I have run 100 100 year storm simulations using models calibrated to mimic those used by AIR and RMS, the two leading modeling companies on which TWIA has relied. Should members of the committee or staff have any questions on the technical details of the model or how variants of the law would affect the conclusons here, I am willing to try to assist.

Based on that research I find that over the initial 20 years of H.B. 2352 with a runoff, and assuming TWIA does not purchase reinsurance, TWIA policyholder premiums will cover about 68% of the losses suffered during that time period. The remaining losses will be paid 6% from replenishment of the catastrophe reserve fund, 8% from class A bonds, 5% from class B bonds, and 9% from class C bonds. Troublingly, 4% of the losses have no identified source of funding. If one assumes instead that TWIA purchases reinsurance at the top of the bonding stack in an amount equal to 1.4% of its direct exposure, as it has done in the past, TWIA policyholder premiums and reinsurance paid for by TWIA policyholder premiums cover a total of 61% of losses suffering during that time period. The remaining losses will be paid 8% from replenishment of the catastrophe reserve fund, 10% from class A bonds, 6% from Class B bonds, and 11% from class C bonds. The percent of losses that have no identified source of funding has decreased, but still rests at 3%. These numbers are, of necessity approximate, and they indeed vary based on a variety of assumptions that need to be made. I have not had the luxury of a large amount of time in which to refine the analysis. In general, however, I believe they accurately reflect the benefits and burdens of H.B. 2352 and S.B. 1089.

This simulation attempts to quantify the benefits and risks to TWIA policyholders created by H.B. 2352 as well as the burden it places on those not receiving direct benefit from TWIA policies. Personally, I do not like what occurs if H.B. 2352 were used to prop up a $72 billion TWIA. The concentration of correlated risk in that entity inevitably makes it an expensive proposition in which the organization either pays exorbitant prices to reinsurers or continues to run the risk of an inadequate stack of protection against larger storm. I believe there is much to the idea of significantly depopulating TWIA with an assigned risk plan or similar mechanism that decorrelates the risk by forced pooling with non-windstorm risk throughout Texas.

If, however, you want to persist with a large propped up TWIA but want to avoid otherwise inevitable biennial fights, it is crucial that the bonding limits contained in this bill with respect to Class A, B and C securities be stated not as absolute numbers, $1 billion, $900 million, $2.75 billion but, as you have wisely done in this bill with the CRTF, percentages of some measure of overall risk to the pool, perhaps direct exposure. Without this modification, the risk grows of storms overwhelming TWIA’s bonding capacity.

Finally, for reasons I have outlined elsewhere I persist in my view that wealthy people on the coast receive subsidized property insurance from poor people away from the coast. This bill continues that inequity although it masks the subsidization by terming what amounts to regional and statewide property taxes as premium surcharges or assessments on insurers. I would thus suggest that the bulking up of the CRTF that takes place in the early years of the HR 2352 plan be made less by non-TWIA policyholders on the coast and assessments on insurers, but more heavily by TWIA policyholders themselves, who will, notwithstanding the benefit that each part of Texas bestows on the other, be the primary beneficiaries of the CRTF protection.

 

I’m showing below a condensed version CDF on which this analysis depends.  You can get the full version here. If you don’t see anything substantive, you need to download the free CDF player so that you can interact within your browser with the model I have created.

[WolframCDF source=”http://catrisk.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/HB-2352-Analysis.cdf” CDFwidth=”600″ CDFheight=”1600″ altimage=”http://catrisk.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/overview-getplayer_off.png”]

Some further caveats and comments

  1. I am fully aware that this work done on short notice by an individual and not one certified as an actuary, though I do believe I have the skills to produce what I have done. As I have written elsewhere, the Texas legislature should seriously consider establishing an insurance think tank to help it with issues like this.
  2. The premiums in this model are static.  There is some possibility that as the size of the catastrophe reserve fund grows and TWIA is better able to handle storms without resort to post-event bonding, the premiums could decline.
  3. The basic problem with TWIA is that its risk is correlated.  If it were decorrelated, the premiums policyholders pay would likely be adequate to cover its losses and no cross subsidization would be needed.  The problem is that TWIA needs to build up its catastrophe reserve fund to the point where it is no longer dependent on the risks of post-event bonding or the expense of reinsurance.  Until it does this, a system that bundles up correlated risk is going to remain either really expensive or run a risk of insolvency.