According to industry publication The Insurance Insider, TWIA has secured the rights to $1 billion in reinsurance attaching at $1.7 billion. TWIA also has the option of instead obtaining a larger $1.25 billion in reinsurance but with a higher $2.2 billion attachment point. Both policies apparently cost about the same, likely around $100 million or about 23% of TWIA’s available cash. Purchase of the reinsurance, while helping to protect the struggling state-sponsored insurer for this summer, will, however, reduce TWIA’s ability to increase its internal Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund. Purchase will thus keep Texas’ largest coastal windstorm nsurer dependent on this expensive form of protection.
Note: I’ve taken a second look at this bill and done a better job in analyzing it. Look here.
S.B. 1700 from Senator Larry Taylor of Friendswood and its House cognate, H.B. 3622 from Representative Dennis Bonnen of Brazoria/Matagorda are the only bills among the major contenders in the legislature this session that addresses the short run problem with the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association. And H.B. 3622 is set for a hearing in the Texas House Insurance Committee this April 30, 2013, at 2 p.m. As with H.B. 2352 from Representative Todd Hunter and its cognate S.B. 1089 from Senator Juan “Chuy” Hinojosa, however, the Taylor/Bonnen bills prop up TWIA largely with money from people other than TWIA policyholders. In this instance, the entities that pay for much of the windstorm risk on the Texas coast are (1) Texas taxpayers via a reduction in otherwise owing premium tax revenue and (2) owners of insured homes, autos and other insured property (or liability insurance) throughout Texas via an assessment on insurers likely to be passed on in higher premiums. Here’s a legislative analysis.
The key to S.B. 1700 and H.B. 3622 is to make sure that no storm that causes less than about $1 billion in losses to TWIA needs to try to use post-event Class 1 Bonds to pay claims — a good idea considering that these bonds have been found to be unrateable and probably could not be issued in a large amount. Right now, it only takes a storm causing more than $180 million before TWIA will first look to Class 1 Bonds in order to pay claims. The padding between storms and the tenuous Class 1 Bonds is, at least for the 2013 hurricane season, not additional money from TWIA policyholders but instead an assessment on property and casualty insurers statewide. This assessment could be up to $800 million.
The bill softens the blow of this $800 million exposure in two ways. First, up to $300 million of such an assessment could be credited against premium taxes the insurers would otherwise owe to Texas. This crediting would take place in installments, however, lasting a minimum of 5 years. Thus, in essence, Texas insurers are compelled to fork over up to $500 million and to front an interest-free $300 million loan to the state in order to pay clams. (And even if they never pay, they will have to stockpile some reserves to address this contingent liability.) I have suggested elsewhere that it would insult the insurance industry to suggest that they will not find a way to get this money back. An obvious target will be Texas policyholders. Second, for each dollar the insurers pay at the lower attachment point (just above the end of the Catastrophe Reserve Trust Fund) they reduce the exposure they now have at a higher attachment point, one that lies above the top of the Class 2 Bonds or the Class 2 Alternative Bonds. And the insurers no longer have to really pay fully for Class 3 assessments. Instead, up to $300 million, they just make an interest-free loan to the state that gets paid back over a minimum of 5 years via a reduction in otherwise owing premium taxes.
Here’s an interactive visualization of the effect of S.B. 1700. You’ll need to obtain and install the free CDF player to actually be interactive with this medium.
[WolframCDF source=”http://catrisk.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/SB-1700.cdf” CDFwidth=”560″ CDFheight=”800″ altimage=”http://catrisk.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/SB-1700.png”]
So, if I had to guess at the realistic size of the TWIA stack today, I would say it was perhaps $600 million: $180 million in CRTF, perhaps a sale of 25% of the amount authorized in Class 1 Bonds, and perhaps 25% of the amount authorized in Class 2 Alternative Bonds. If S.B. 1700 were to pass, the stack would grow to perhaps $1.5 million: $180 million in CRTF, $800 million in insurer assessments (some of which would just be an interest free loan), and, again, perhaps sale of 25% of the amount authorized in Class 1 Bonds, and perhaps 25% of the amount authorized in Class 2 Alternative Bonds. Due to the bug in the existing statute — one that is not (yet) fixed in the Taylor bill — it’s my opinion that no Class 3 securities are likely to be issued. I also have doubts that useful reinsurance can currently be purchased by TWIA due to confusion about the appropriate attachment point.
A few additional comments.
1. I’d like to run analysis similar to that done on H.B. 2352 about how much of the expected risk of tropical cyclones is born by each group under S.B. 1700 and H.B. 3622. My suspicion is that a great deal will be borne by insureds statewide due to the low assessment attachment point. A great deal will be eaten by TWIA policyholders themselves in uninsured losses because, unless pieces of the statute are fixed, the realistic height of the stack is not the touted $4 billion but a number far lower than that. In other words, S.B. 1700 and H.B. 3622, though they raise the height of the TWIA stack, still leaves a substantial risk of insolvency.
2. The bill has a provision I like: it prohibits TWIA from purchasing reinsurance with low attachment points. This prohibition prevents TWIA from deciding to sacrifice policyholder interests in favor of insurance company interests. How to trade these two interests off is a matter that should be resolved, as this bill does, by the legislature.
3. This bill does nothing to address major structural problems with TWIA. These include:
- low deductibles and no coinsurance that lead to problems of moral hazard
- failure to warn TWIA policyholders about the risk of insolvency
- continued subsidization by poor people throughout Texas of million dollar homes on the Texas coast
- continued concentration of risk in a single entity that invariably leads to a difficult tradeoff between paying extremely high rates for reinsurance — and thereby preventing growth of an internal catastrophe reserve fund — or subjecting policyholders to a substantial risk of insolvency
- fails to address the needless fragility of Class 3 Bonds. [This is not right, see my update]