A 1.5-2% risk per year of losing your home with inadequate insurance is a serious risk

For the 2011-12 hurricane season, the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association managed to purchase $636 million in reinsurance coverage for a net cost of about $83 million.  As a result of this purchase, having about $150 million in a piggybank, and the legality of TWIA borrowing about $2.5 billion following a serious loss, this means that TWIA had — roughly $3.2 billion — available to pay claims.  TWIA admits and my own computations based on the Weibull Distribution confirm that this leaves a 1.5-2% chance that TWIA, even with a lot of borrowing, will not have enough money to honor its obligations in full.

Here’s a picture of the TWIA funding stack.

TWIA Funding Stack

One and a half to two percent may not sound that awful.  That’s what some coastal Texas Representatives such as Todd Hunter are asserting. But their reassurances should not bring much comfort nor deflect attention from the serious problem facing Texas.

First — one and a half to two percent risks in fact occur. The fact that the risk is relatively small does not mean you should not insure against it.  Would you, for example, tell a 65 year old with a family to support not to worry about life insurance for the next year because there was only a 1.5% chance or so of dying during that time period  Would you, for example, tell a homeowner not to worry that their automobile insurance policy did not cover them for, losses during three months of each year because only about 1.5% of homeowners make claims during any three month period? (http://research3.bus.wisc.edu/file.php/129/Papers/PredModelHomeowners21July2010.pdf).  Or, let’s play a game.  Flip a coin six times in a row.  If it comes up all heads, you lose your house.  That’s about a 1.5% risk.  Want to play?  Perhaps you are all more courageous than I am, but I would worry.

Second, although a 1.5-2% risk may be unlikely to occur in any given year, just looking at a one year period is a strange way of thinking about it.  Say you own your home for 10 years or are thinking of investing in a business in Galveston.  If TWIA does not mend its ways, suddenly the risk of TWIA suffering a bankrupting loss during your period of investment jumps to 14-18%.  That’s calculated using something called the binomial distribution. Would you worry that if you rolled a single die and it came up 6 you would lose your house.  Again, maybe some politicians are particularly courageous, but I would be concerned.

Third, the 1.5-2% risk of TWIA going insolvent in any year is not the only risk created by the current funding structure.  There is something like a 15% chance that the next year will bring a storm large enough to force TWIA to borrow.  And the way TWIA first pays that money back is first by raising premiums on TWIA policyholders, pure and simple. The statute I’ve set forth below (section 2210.612 of the Texas Insurance Code makes that clear).  If we expand to our 10 year time horizon, the probability that TWIA will have to borrow goes into the 70% range.

Section 2210.612 of the Texas Insurance Code

And it gets worse.  If TWIA raises premiums substantially to pay off these “Class 1 Public Securities,”  some people will drop out of TWIA and find alternatives.  This means the rates TWIA will need to charge go up even more.  And more people drop out.  Reverse funding insurance creates a risk that TWIA will unravel — a risk lenders will surely take into account in figuring out what interest rate to charge TWIA in the event it has to borrow.

Actually, it gets yet worse, but I will save that and one other matter for other posts.

It’s a Weibull

To understand the premiums charged by the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association and the current legal and financial issues being debated in Austin, you have to get your hands a little dirty with the actuarial science.  You need to have some ability to model the damages likely to be caused by a tropical cyclone on the Texas coast.  Now, to do this really well, it might be thought you need an awful lot of very fine data.  In fact, however, you can do a pretty good job of understanding TWIA’s perspective by just reverse engineering publicly available information.

What I want to show is that the perceived annual exposure to the Texas Windstorm Association can be really well modeled by something known in statistics as a Weibull Distribution. To be fancy, it’s a zero-censored three parameter Weibull Distribution: 

CensoredDistribution[{0, ∞},
 WeibullDistribution[0.418001, 1.26765*10^8, -4.81157*10^8]]

We can plot the results of this distribution against the predictions made by TWIA’ s two consultants: AIR and RMS. The x-axis of the graph are the annual losses to TWIA.  The y-axis of the graph is the probability that the losses will be less than or equal to the corresponding amount on the x-axis. As one can see, it is almost a perfect fit.  For statisticians, the “adjusted R Squared” value is 0.995. 

Image

 

How did I find this function? Part of it is some intuition and some expertise about loss functions.  But a lot of it comes from running a “non-linear regression” on data in the public domain.  Here’s a chart (an “exceedance table”) provided by reinsurance broker Guy Carpenter to TWIA.  It shows the estimates of two consultants, AIR and RMS, about the losses likely to be suffered by TWIA.  Basically, you can use statistics software (I used Mathematica) to run a non-linear regression on this data and assume the underlying model is a censored Weibull distribution of some sort.  And, in less than a second, out pop the parameters to the Weibull distribution that best fit the data. As shown above it fits the AIR and RMS data points really well.  Moreover, it calculates the “AAL” (the mean annual loss to TWIA) pretty well too.

 

Image

In some forthcoming posts, I’ m going to show what the importance of this finding is, but suffice it to say, it explains a lot about the current controversy and suggests some matters to be examined with care.

The Op Ed on TWIA run by the Austin American Statesman

This op ed was run by the Austin American Statesman on July 10.  I am reprinting it here.

Leaving denser coastal counties out to dry if major windstorms strike

Seth J.Chandler, Special Contributor

Published: 7:11 p.m. Tuesday, July 10, 2012

 

The biggest windstorm in Texas so far this summer has been generated not by the warm waters of the tropics but by the courage of Texas Insurance Commissioner Eleanor Kitzman.

In June, Kitzman responded to a request from state Rep. John Smithee, R-Amarillo, by stating that the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association would be unable to pay claims fully if some Category 4 or higher hurricanes hit.

The state-created operation provides insurance against tropical storms and hurricanes on $72 billion worth of property owned by 259,000 people living on the Texas coast.

Kitzman further said the law did not require the State of Texas to rescue either an insolvent TWIA or Texas homeowners and businesses left with incompletely paid claims.

For this statement, Kitzman has been vilified by some coastal media outlets and by some coastal politicians, culminating in a call this week by state Rep. J.M. Lozano, R-Kingsville, for Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott to investigate her for breaking Texas law.

What was Kitzman’s possible crime? Lozano says her letter may have made a “misleading representation regarding the financial condition of an insurer” or somehow violated a state pledge not to impair collection of assessments on bonds that TWIA might issue following a major hurricane.

Kitzman’s real crime was daring to tell the truth to people who do not want to be confronted, now that hurricane season has started again, with the consequences of an irresponsible decision. In summer 2009, the Texas Legislature, to much praise, did fix a flaw in the old system of insulating Texas coastal residents from the cruelties of the private insurance market.

The Legislature saved Texas insurers, even ones not writing insurance near the coast, from the potential of unlimited assessments to pay for a major hurricane. But in doing so, it deliberately chose to reject a competing plan that would have forced TWIA to use actuarially sound rates and that took modern science on global warming into account.

The state Legislature instead used two sleights of hand in 2009 to make the tough medicine go down.The first was to keep current premiums lower by running insurance in reverse. Rather than forcing TWIA to collect enough premiums now to have cash on hand in the event of a major hurricane, the legislators chose to rely on “post-event bonding” vehicles called Class 1, 2 and 3 Securities.

Texas insurers will raise premiums and not just on windstorm insurance and not just on the coast after a hurricane, when people would already be hurting, to pay for these classes of securities that it assumes it will be able to sell following a major storm.

Texas’ second trick was to choose not to insure fully against the costliest hurricanes, such as a Category 4 or 5 hitting Galveston County. As TWIA itself puts the matter, “currently, there is no funding for TWIA losses in excess of Class 3 public securities” or about $3.6 billion.

The Texas Legislature saved money the same way you could if you insured your $8,000 or your $32,000 car for a maximum of $8,000 loss with the thought that fender-benders are frequent, but really catastrophic events seldom happen.

Such a system would indeed lower your premiums, and it might fully protect the less expensive car. And, if all went well, such a policy might even protect the more expensive car. But it still places your expensive car at risk.

Whether consciously or not, in 2009 the less-propertied Texas coastal counties, such as Kleberg and San Patricio, from which Lozano hails, hornswoggled the rest of the state into accepting a system that probably can pay even their major claims fully (like totaling the $8,000 car) but left the more propertied coastal counties, Galveston and Brazoria, at risk for major claims or totals.

So, if we’re shooting messenger, Kitzman, for telling Texas the truth about its underfunded public windstorm insurance system or, possibly worse, for promoting its restructuring, shoot me, too.

I declare again, as a law professor who has studied TWIA’s statutes and its finances for many years: The Texas Windstorm Insurance Association does not have the financial capacity to pay claims fully in the event a major hurricane strikes a property-rich Texas county and neither the state nor anyone else is under any current legal obligation to make up the difference.

Perhaps you should shoot me first because, unburdened by whatever political constraints may keep Commissioner Kitzman more polite, I further declare that the coastal counties, having deliberately chosen to underinsure and reap the benefits of lower premiums, have no moral claims on Texas, either.

Chandler is Foundation Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center and director of its Program on Law and Computation; schandler@uh.edu.

Why I blog on Texas Windstorms

I am blogging because Texas, and other coastal states, have set themselves up for disaster by engineering flimsy legal and financial regimes to address the risks of tropical cyclones.  I read accounts in the press or on the Internet that are based on incredible misinformation and wishful thinking that nature will not respect. I see many politicians in a cycle of untruths with their constituents that leave coastal residents and businesses at significant risk of a catastrophe. Selfishly, I know that I, a semi-coastal resident, will be asked, one way or another to help pick up the pieces in an expensive way if a major storm hits a densely populated part of the Texas Coast.

I am also blogging because, immodestly, I have considerable expertise in this area and can’t just submit every thought to the Houston Chronicle and hope that they publish it. As a law professor at the University of Houston Law Center with a deep interest in actuarial science and finance, I’ve studied the legal and financial operations of the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association for many years.

Finally, I guess I am blogging because I want to give some courage to people who want to look at the Texas insurance scene with an open mind.  I have seen one Texas political figure, Insurance Commissioner Eleanor Kitzman, vilified by many coastal politicians and residents for daring to tell the truth about the risks now being run.  That is just wrong.   We say we want politicians to tell us the truth.  But do we really?  So, my hope is to give useful information and analysis to people who dare to look without prejudice at Texas windstorm situation. 

I’ll be using several tools to present information.  WordPress supports text and pictures and all the usual stuff.  I’ll  use those modes of expression to the best of my ability. But it also supports interactive tools (CDF technology) that let you, the reader, really explore the situation and make up your own mind.  And, ultimately, I suspect that is how we will all learn best.

So, enjoy, read and think.